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Abstract—Reliability is a critical consideration to DL- based
systems. But the statistical nature of DL makes it quite vulnerable
to invalid inputs, i.e., those cases that are not considered in
the training phase of a DL model. This paper proposes to
perform data sanity check to identify invalid inputs, so as to
enhance the reliability of DL-based systems. We design and
implement a tool to detect behavior deviation of a DL model
when processing an input case. This tool extracts the data flow
footprints and conducts an assertion-based validation mechanism.
The assertions are built automatically, which are specifically-
tailored for DL model data flow analysis. Our experiments
conducted with real-world scenarios demonstrate that such an
assertion-based data sanity check mechanism is effective in
identifying invalid input cases.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, deep learning (DL) techniques have shown
great effectiveness in various aspects. A huge amount of DL-
based applications and systems have been proposed in favor
of peoples daily life and industrial production [1]–[3], even
in safety-critical applications. Reliability is hence of great
significance for practical DL- based systems.
It is widely-accepted that every software system has its valid
input domain [4]–[7]. Inputs staying in such a domain, namely,
valid inputs, are expected to receive proper execution results.
Unfortunately, in real circumstances, there is no guarantee the
inputs are always valid. Anomalous, unexpected inputs may
arrive and result in unpredictable misbehavior, which in turn
degrades reliability. In particular, this is a severe threat to
the reliability of DL-based systems. The statistical-inference
nature of DL models makes them quite vulnerable to invalid
input cases.
In this paper, we propose SaneDL , a tool that provides
systematic data Sanity che ck for Deep Learning-based Sys-
tems. SaneDL serves as a lightweight, flexible, and adaptive
plugin for DL models, which can achieve effective detection
of invalid inputs during system runtime. The key notion of
SaneDL design is that a DL-model will behave differently
given valid input cases and the invalid ones. The behavior
deviation is the symptom of invalid input cases [8]. Since a
DL model is not complicated in its control flow, we use data
flow to model its behaviors. SaneDL provides an assertion-
based mechanism. Such assertions, typically, are constructed
via AutoEncoder [9], which exhibits a perfect compatibility
with the DL model. Similarly to traditional assertions for
general programs inserted between code blocks, the assertions
are inserted in certain network layers, so as to detect behavior
deviations in a data flow perspective. Invalid input cases are
thus identified effectively.
We summarize the contributions of this paper as follows.
• We approach reliability enhancement of DL systems via
data sanity check. We proposed a tool, namely SaneDL,
to perform data sanity check for DL-based systems.
SaneDL provides assertion mechanism to detect behavior
deviation of DL model. To our knowledge, SaneDL is the
first assertion-based tool that can automatically detects
invalid input cases for DL systems. Our work can shed
light to other practices in improving DL reliability.
• SaneDL adopts a non-intrusive design that will not de-
grade the performance of the target DL model. In other
words, the SaneDL mechanism does not require the
adaptation of the target DL model. As a result, SaneDL
can be easily applied to existing DL-based systems.
• We show the effectiveness and efficiency of invalid input
detection via real-world invalid input cases, other than
manipulated faulty samples typically used in the com-
munity. This proves the SaneDL mechanism is promising.
We will then discuss our approach in Section II and the
evaluation in Section III. Some related work are listed in
Section IV. We conclude this work in Section V.
II. METHODOLOGIES
Figure 1 shows the framework of SaneDL. Generally, for
a pre-trained DNN model, the execution process of SaneDL
follows the following workflow.
First, a series of AutoEncoder (AE) [9] based assertions are
inserted into the structure of a pre-trained DNN. Specifically,
given a pre-trained neural network N , we insert AE networks
between its layers. These AEs are trained using the interme-
diate result generated by each layer of N .
Fig. 1. Overview of SaneDL
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Then, for a given input, such assertions take the intermediate
results of neural network as inputs to evaluate the anomalous
degree via the losses. AEs can reconstruct all intermediate
results from valid inputs. For valid inputs, the intermediate
results can be properly restored by AEs. But for invalid inputs,
the intermediate results of invalid puts show abnormal patterns.
Hence the reconstruction leads to a huge deviation with a high
loss value that dont fit the AEs.
We check each assertions by using properly preset thresh-
olds to constrain the losses. Formally, it can be expressed as
the follow equation:
Thres = δ ·
∑m
j=1 LossAE(IRj)
m
The IRj stands for the input of the AE, which is the intermedi-
ate result at certain layer of the jth case in the training set. The
m means the total samples of the training set. The δ represents
the scale coefficient, which determines the assertion threshold
as a certain scale of the mean loss of valid inputs. Our practice
shows that selecting this scale coefficient in a interval from 2
to 4 (i.e. δ ∈ [2, 4]) results in good performance.
Lastly, the assertion results then determine the validity of
given input. Only those inputs that pass all the assertions(i.e.
the losses don’t exceed any constrains) are verified as valid
inputs that the deep learning system can properly handle.
III. EXPERIMENT
A. Experimental Setup
We build two experimental target scenarios to evluate the
effectiveness of SaneDL. For Scenario I, we build a test
set with a combination of cases from Fashion-MNIST and
MNIST1, so as to test if SaneDL can successfully enhance a
pre-trained model on Fashion-MNIST, i.e. to detect invalid
inputs from MNIST dataset. Similarly, for Scenario II, we
train traffic sign recognition models based on GTSRB2 [10],
and then test the embedded SaneDL with a hybrid test set.
Such hybrid test set is built by combining extra cases from
FlickrLogos-273 [11] with the original test. We test if SaneDL
can figure out those invalid inputs of commercial signs from
traffic signs.
We build pre-trained models in different network structures.
For Fashion-MNIST, we use LeNet [12] and AlexNet [13].
And for GTSRB, the AlexNet and VGG16 [14] are utilized.
We consider the True Positive Rate(TPR) and the False Pos-
itive Rate(FPR) as two proper metrics to evaluate the per-
formance of SaneDL in detecting invalid inputs. Besides, the
ROC-AUC score is also considered as one of our evaluation
metrics to evaluate the overall performance under different δ.
Table I shows the detection results in two scenarios. For
each test setting, we inject invalid cases by randomly replacing
1Fashion-MNIST is a public dataset providing pictures of fashionable
clothing. MNIST is another public dataset consists of handwritten digits
images.
2GTSRB stands for German Traffic Sign Recognition Benchmark, which
is a dataset consists of traffic signs of different categories
3FlickrLogos-27 is dataset containing real images of various brand logos
that appear in the wild
TABLE I
EVALUATION RESULTS ON INVALID INPUT DETECTION IN SCENARIO I
Dataset Fashion-Mnist & Mnist GTSRB & Flickr
Model LeNet AlexNet AlexNet VGG
Invalid Inputs Hand-write Digits Commercial Signs
Metrics
TPR 0.9919 0.9975 0.9451 0.9268
FPR 0.0156 0.0221 0.1002 0.0801
AUC 0.9978 0.9987 0.9808 0.9716
some cases in the original test set with the invalid input cases.
The results exhibits remarkable performance of SaneDL.
IV. RELATED WORK
A. Input Validation and Sanitization in Software
In real production environment, input validation is usually
required to prevent unexpected inputs from violating system’s
pre-defined functionalities. Existing approaches seek for ways
that better perform sanity check for specific scenarios [15]–
[22]. All these work shows input validation plays an important
role in maintaining software reliability. However, few experi-
ences on applying input validation to deep learning systems.
SaneDL is hence designed to achieve this functionality, so as
to enhance the reliability of deep learning systems.
B. Deep Learning Testing
Recent studies in SE community realize the inadequacy of
traditional deep learning testing via statistical results(e.g. ac-
curacy), which can hardly expose the specific defects of neural
network. Therefore, several work tends to regard deep neural
network as a sophisticated software and apply systematic
testing mechanisms according to software engineering domain
knowledge [23]–[29]. On the other hand, test case generation
turns out to be another effective approach to extend the
testing effect in deep learning systems to enhance performance
and reliability [30]–[32]. However, excessive manipulations
can violate the internal feature of the original cases. This
work more considers deep learning systems’ deployment in
real practice, where true real-world cases can be encountered
instead of manipulated ones.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Deep learning systems exhibit huge effectiveness in real life.
But, it may suffer from invalid inputs encountered in complex
circumstances. This work presents our efforts on handling
invalid inputs that deep learning systems may come across
in practice. We propose a white-box verification framework,
namely, SaneDL to perform systematic data sanity check
for deep learning systems via assertion-based mechanism. It
works in an efficient, non-intrusive manner to detect invalid
inputs. Our experiment shows its good performance when
being applied to two practical problem scenarios, where the
invalid input cases are real-world cases rather than manually-
generated toy cases.
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